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While the world is dealing with the Coronavirus, Russia is moving fast with its
constitutional reform. Nothing can stop it. Everything should be finished in less than
two months and approved by the all-Russia’s vote on April 22.
These days the question about Putin’s (or Russia’s?) future after 2024 got a clear
answer. On 10 March, the State Duma supported an amendment, which, if it
enters into force, will allow Putin to participate in the presidential elections 2024.
Although the amendment is constitutionally questionable – substantively as well as
procedurally – Russia’s Constitutional Court is likely to give its approval.
Russia’s Constitution
Before analysing Putin’s constitutional initiatives some preliminary remarks should
be made regarding the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
The Constitution was adopted by referendum on December 12, 1993, proclaimed
by President Yeltsin, and came into force on December 25, 1993. It abolished
the Soviet constitution of 1978 as well as the soviet system of government. This
constitution is the second-longest valid constitution of Russia after the so-called
Stalinist constitution of 1936. Structurally, it consists of a preamble, 9 chapters, and
concluding and interim provisions.
Since 1993, the Constitution has been amended several times with some minor
changes. The major changes happened in 2008, when the presidential terms and
those for the lower house of parliament were extended. Thus, the constitutional
initiatives of 2020 are the most significant constitutional reforms in Russia’s
modern history. In general, these changes are designed to prevent changes and
transformation; it is unlikely that they will open a new political era for the Russian
Federation.
Constitutional Reform and 2024
Putin’s constitutional reform is his answer to the question of 2024: What will happen
next?
Russia’s Constitution explicitly states that ‘one and the same person may not
be elected President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive
terms’ (Article 81 (3)). Putin, who rose to the presidency on New Year’s Eve 1999
(nominated by Boris Yeltsin’s as his successor) and who had served for two four-
year terms after the elections in March 2000, had to make a ‘chess castling’ in 2008
because of this constitutional provision: He moved Medvedev to the presidency
for a term and became his prime minister, not giving up any real power. During
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Medvedev’s presidency the Constitution was changed to extend the presidential term
from four to six years to benefit Putin: In 2012, he returned to the Kremlin for a six-
year term; in 2018, he was re-elected. Thus, according to Article 81(3), Putin cannot
run for presidency in 2024. He would have to step down or change the rules.
There were several options to extend his power beyond the current presidential term.
The simplest one would have been to repeat a chess castling and rule the country
from the chair of prime minister. The second option would have been to follow
President Lukashenko’s example, who removed a ‘limit of two consecutive terms’
from the Belorussian Constitution. However, Putin’s strategy is more complicated.
At the beginning of the constitutional reform (January, February) it seemed that
Russia’s President was ready to leave the presidency and was in search of a model
which would allow him to maintain influence. His annual state-of-nation speech
on 15 January and the first and second drafts of the constitutional amendments
were interpreted as an intention to step down. In particular, the proposals to ensure
guarantees to former presidents, the upgrade of the status of the State Council to
the level of a constitutional body and the creation of the Security Council (which
appeared in the second draft) were signs of this intention. The scenario that
Putin would head the newly empowered State Council or the newly established
Security Council (like, for instance the former president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan
Nazarbayev, did after resigning in March 2019) was real. Now this scenario can be a
plan ‘B’, if a plan ‘A’ to stay in the presidency after 2024, which was articulated on 10
March, does not work.
No new Putin… Long live Putin!
One of Putin’s amendments removes the word ‘consecutive’ from Article 81 (3)
imposing a conclusive two-term limit on future Russian presidents. On the one hand,
Putin demonstrates that he does not want his successor, whoever it is, to stay in
power for long. In this sense, the amendment to Article 81 means no ‘new Putin’. On
the other hand, the State Duma gave this amendment a prospective interpretation
and created a legal loophole for Putin to stay in power after 2024.
On March 10, Valentina Tereshkova, the State Duma deputy, popular nationally as
the first woman in space, voiced a proposal which was not on the paper: “I suggest
that we either lift the restriction on the number of presidential terms or indicate in
an article of this bill that the incumbent president, just like any other citizen, has the
right to run for president after the updated constitution takes effect”. This proposal,
which deputies met with applause, resets Putin’s current two presidential terms to
zero. It means that in 2024 he would be able to run once again with a chance to be
re-elected in 2030 for the next six years. Long live Putin, till 2036!
Putin, who was invited to the State Duma to express his opinion regarding this
proposal, stressed that he would not oppose this change if Russia’s Constitutional
Court confirms its constitutionality and if the proposal is supported by the majority
of the all-Russia vote. He also stressed that since the constitutional reform will
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be approved by Russia’s citizens, there is no need to have early parliamentary
elections.
Making references to the Constitutional Court and the all-Russia’s vote Putin aims to
create a picture that the constitutional reform follows the constitutional procedures.
But is this true?
Constitutional Reform: Procedural Issues
Although the Constitution of the Russian Federation regulates procedures for
constitutional changes, the bill on the constitutional amendments is preoccupied with
procedural issues. Structurally, it includes three articles: Article 1 lists changes to the
Constitution, Articles 2 and 3 are devoted to procedural issues of the constitutional
reform, setting up the mechanism of the all-Russia’s vote and regulating the role
of the Constitutional Court, accordingly. In fact, the Bill foresees a special, ad hoc,
procedure within which the amendments would come in force. This procedure differs
from the procedure specified in Chapter 9 of the Constitution.
What does the Constitution of the Russian Federation say?
Chapter 9 (articles 134-137) of the Constitution envisages two separate procedures
for constitutional changes depending on the chapter concerned. The procedure
of amendments to Chapters 3-8 is similar to that of the adoption of federal
constitutional laws (Article 136): a bill on constitutional amendments should be
approved by not less than 3/4 of the total number of the members of the Council
of the Federation (the higher house of the parliament) and not less than 2/3 of the
total number of the deputies of the State Duma (the lower house of the parliament).
Then, the constitutional amendments come into force after they are approved by the
legislatures of not less than 2/3 of the subjects of the Russian Federation. Thus, the
amendments to these chapters do not need to be approved by referendum.
Changes to Chapter 1 ‘The Fundamentals of the Constitutional System’, Chapter
2 ‘Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen’ and Chapter 9 ‘Constitutional
Amendments and Review of the Constitution’ foresee a special procedure of the
revision of the Constitution as a whole. If changes to these Chapters are supported
by 3/5 of the total number of the members of the Council of the Federation and
the deputies of the State Duma, the Constitutional Assembly shall be convened.
The Assembly can either confirm the invariability of the Constitution or draft a new
Constitution. In the last case, a new Constitution can be adopted by 2/3 of the total
number of the Assembly or by referendum.
Russia’s constitutional reform follows none of these procedures, creating a third way
to amend the Constitution.
How will the constitutional reform be implemented?
Articles 2 and 3 of the Bill on the constitutional amendments address the practical
questions of the constitutional reform. Its implementation will move through
three stages. At the first stage, after parliament adopts a bill on constitutional
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amendments, it should be approved by 2/3 of the subjects of the Russian
Federation. Then, at the second stage, the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation should confirm (i) the constitutionality of the amendments in the context
of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 and (ii) the constitutionality of the all-Russia vote shall serve
as a mechanism of the final approval of the amendments. The decision should be
made within 7 days upon the President’s request.
If the Constitutional Court rules that the amendments or the procedure of the all-
Russia vote are unconstitutional, the amendments will not come in force and the all-
Russia vote will not be conducted. Accordingly, if the Constitutional Court confirms
the constitutionality of Putin’s initiatives, the constitutional reform moves on to the
third stage – the all-Russia vote which will be held in accordance with Article 2 of the
Bill on the constitutional amendments.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation does not foresee participation of the
Constitutional Court and Russia’s citizens in the constitutional reform if Chapters
3-8 are concerned. Their involvement in the constitutional process reflects the
Kremlin’s main fears that the constitutional initiatives could be challenged as illegal
or illegitimate. In this sense, the function of the Constitutional Court is to remove all
doubts about the constitutionality of the constitutional reform as a whole and each
amendment particularly, while the all-Russia’s vote is called to demonstrate people’s
loyalty to the president and his proposals.
It should be noted that the Constitutional Court will have a lot of work justifying the
constitutionality of some amendments. The problem here is not only resetting Putin’s
presidential terms. The problems with the constitutionality of the amendments in
terms of Chapter 1 and 2 are wider and deeper. For instance, in the context of Article
3 (3), which defines only two forms of the supreme direct expression of the power
of the people – referendum and free elections – the all-Russia’s vote as a means of
approving the constitutional amendments is problematic.
Another problem is that almost all amendments to Chapter 3 ‘The Federal Structure’
regulate questions which are fundamental for the constitutional system (the
principles of local self-government, national, cultural and demographic policy,
social guarantees, the ban of same-sex marriage etc.) and can only be addressed
within Chapter 1, which sets up special procedures for reviewing the Constitution.
Moreover, some of the amendments are in conflict with the provisions of Chapter
1 (for instance, amended Article 79 which gives Russian law supremacy over
international obligations and Article 15 which proclaims priority of international law).
Considering, however, that the Constitutional Court is controlled by the President
(the constitutional reform even increases this control) its decision is predictable. The
Constitutional Court will confirm the constitutionality of the Bill on the constitutional
amendments in general terms without providing a sound, article by article, analysis.
The positive decision of the Constitutional Court will enforce Article 2 of the Bill and
trigger the all-Russia vote. This procedure is similar to a referendum. Yet, it is not
a referendum, rather its imitation. The all-Russia’s vote is invented to legitimize
Putin’s constitutional reform: on the one hand, the Kremlin needs Russia’s citizens
to approve the amended Constitution, on the other hand, it cannot be sure about a
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positive result. The state is not ready to take a risk. The all-Russia’s vote, a quasi-
referendum, solves this problem.
According to Russia’s Law on referenda, the decision is considered adopted, if
over half of the voters who came to the polls supported it and under the condition
that over half of the electorate participated in the referendum. In other words, a
referendum is recognized as valid when over fifty percent of registered voters
participated in it (Article 80).
The all-Russia vote simplifies the referendum procedures. First, there is no
requirement of a minimum participation for the validity of the vote. According to
Article 2 (25) of the Bill, the results will be determined by the number of ballots in
the ballot boxes. The constitutional amendments are approved if over half of voters
voted in their favour. Notably, the number of ballots issued will not be considered.
Second, there is no responsibility for vote rigging and fraud. This gives a wide
space for manipulations. Thus, there is no mechanism to protect the will of the
people expressed by the all-Russia vote and prevent interference. Article 2 of the Bill
circumvents the Law on Referenda creating an illusion of a people’s vote.
Constitutional Reform, Coronavirus and Symbolism
of Dates
On 10 March, after parliament decided to allow Putin to participate in the presidential
elections, the Mayor of Moscow issued a decree to ban large events. This measure
shall prevent the spread of the Coronavirus. At the same time, it is helpful in
supressing protests against Putin’s constitutional initiatives. The ban will expire on
10 April, thus the Coronavirus will not interfere with the all-Russia vote on 22 April
2020.
22 April is not a random date. Russia’s legislation on referenda and elections
prescribes that the people’s votes would be held on a Sunday. In this sense, the all-
Russia vote is treated as an exceptional case: it is scheduled for Wednesday, which
is declared as a free day. In the USSR, the 22 of April was celebrated as Lenin’s
birthday and the Day of the All-Union Pioneer Organisation. This date should be
considered in the context of the references to the USSR, historical truth and glory
of the past (‘The Russian Federation is a successor of the Soviet Union…’; ‘The
Russian Federation united by a thousand-year history, preserves the memory of
ancestors…’; ‘The Russian Federation honours the memory of the defenders of the
fatherland and ensure the protection of historical truth’ (Art. 67 amended)). Thus,
22 April has a symbolic meaning as well as 18 March (the anniversary of Crimea’s
annexation) – the date when the bill on the amendments is expected to be signed by
the President.
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